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Epistemology and Methodology in the Social Sciences: 
The Case of Statistical Discipline 
I. The origin of the modern social sciences,1 from an epistemological point 
of view, has been an extremely complex and difficult process. In the history 
of these sciences, there is certainly no lack of tentative interpretations ema-
nating from the history or sociology of science or even — although less fre-
quently — from philosophy or epistemology itself. In spite of these efforts, 
however, our knowledge in this field has remained limited. Consequently, this 
paper is not intended to provide a kind of general synthesis relating to 
epistemological and methodological problems of the statistical discipline; 
rather, the aim is to raise some of the fundamental questions that arose during 
the formation of this discipline. The development of statistics as a discipline 
which has taken just over 300 years represents a scientific history which ex-
ceeds and precedes that of modern sociology itself. In our opinion, the course 
of development covered by statistics in its scientific history and especially its 
rivalry with modern scientific sociology in the 19th century provides interest-
ing parallels; and even an inventory of its epistemological and methodological 
problems can yield examples illustrative not only of sociology, but of the 
social sciences in general. 
II. The formation of modern statistics was closely linked with the birth 
of modern capitalism.2 The latter was superimposed on the dissolution of 
small economic units which were self-sufficient and feudal in character and the 
dissolution of the social framework including the administration of medieval 
society. The advent of capitalism gave rise to bigger economic units, new 
classes and big, centralized states, and the mass phenomena which were 
emerging became increasingly inaccessible by the traditional sciences and dis-
ciplines. This difficulty and at the same time this necessity led to the emer-
gence at around 1660 of the first two versions of the new discipline of statis-
tics, the Political Arithmetics3 in England and the "Staatenkunde"4 in Ger-
1 MARX, K.: Theorien über den Mehrwert, Stuttgart, 1905, Vol. 1, p. 2 and 
note 1). The manuscript of this paper dates from 1861 and 1863. 
2 Ibid, in the same sense. 
3 HORVATH, R. A.: Essays in Political Arithmetics and Smithanism, Acta 
Universitatis Szegediensis, Juridica et Politica, Vol. XXV. Fasc. 4, Szeged, 1978. 
(Monograph) 
4 By the SAME AUTHOR: Le Developpment de l'Ecole de Statistique Al-
lemande, Acta Univ., Szegediens., Jur. et Pol., Vol. XXVIII. Fasc. 2., Szeged, 1981. 
(Monograph) 
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many, both on a socio-scientific basis since their primary aim was the expli-
cation of the new economic, demographic, social and political realities. 
One of the most famous analysts of economics, Joseph Alois SCHUM-
PETER, in rewriting the history of economic thought under the methodolo-
gical aspect of the development of economic analysis,5 underlined the triple 
condition of the formation and establishment of all new social sciences, 
namely that every new science must find its own subject and its own method 
so that it can be distinguished from all other sciences and, thirdey as SCHUM-
PETER insisted, there must be some form of self-identification, that is to say, 
it should express its diversity by way of a specific and unique designation. 
It seems clear, however, that besides this third condition — that of under-
lining the „differencia specifica" vis-a-vis the other sciences or disciplines — 
there is a fourth, essential requirement which orients every new discipline in 
the opposite direction, that is to say, toward establishing its ,,genus pro-
ximum". its relation with the other sciences in the final interpretation and 
explanation of its system of paradigms and in the conclusions resulting form 
it, established by the new discipline. 
This is what is generally called the „scientific theory" of the new 
discipline which is closely linked not only with fundamental suestions including 
method and subject, but also with the neighbouring disciplines and at , the 
same time with the fundamental problems that occur in all sciences — to put 
it briefly, with philosophy and epistemology proper, and with the theory 
of knowledge. 
III. When comparing the first two versions of the statistical discipline 
mentioned above with the insights manifest in the conditions established by 
SCHUMPETER, one finds, in their parallel development, differences and co-
incidences which are both characteristic and instrutive. The delimination of the 
subject seems to be considerable; but this difference is more imaginary than 
real on the basis of a profound analysis — while that which presents itself in 
the area of methodology remains wholly fundamental in character. The 
method of political arithmetics was already quite similar to the future disci-
pline of unified statistics which developed from the activities of QUETELET 
in the 19th century and, in turn, the method of the description of the States 
could not yet separate from the methods of medieval philosophy. 
As far as the questions of the new statistical disciplines are concerned, the 
political arithmetics has found the latter within the framework of the new 
mass phenomena of emerging English capitalism, by the investigation of phe-
nomena and characteristics relating to pouplation, in particular mortality, and 
by the economic life, consumption, foreign trade, production, budgetary and 
monetary policy and, at the same time, by the problems of a new society 
which was developing around these phenomena. The political arithmeticians 
were interested in the state only as the political organisation of the new 
society in the form of a national and centralized state which promoted coloni-
zation as well as commercial wars, that is to say the most powerful sources of 
the accumulation of capital and wealth in this particular respect. Thus, the 
political arthmeticians were also confronted with the question of "par excel-
lence" of descriptive statistics, i. e., the question of the comparison of rival 
5 SCHUMPETER, J. A.: History of Economic Analysis, Edited "from manuscript 
by BOODY—SCHUMPETER, E., 3rd Ed., New York, 1959, p. 242. 
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states in terms of their wealth, their power, and all their stengths and weak-
nesses to enable an estimation of national potential in the competition of great 
powers, established or potential. 
The concept of the description of the German States established by 
CONRING, which emerged at the same time, referred only to the most import-
ant European States, not in order to study their rivalries, but to describe their 
stage of development. Since the development of capitalist economy in Central 
Europe was considerabliy lagging behind and capitalist society had yet to be 
born, the absolutist enlightened State was the sole agent of the imposed capi-
talist transformation, and it is understandable that this centralized and power-
ful organization completely stifled the imagination of the descriptive sta-
t i s t i ca l . As to their method, it took a long time to separate from late 
medieval philosophy as represented by Aristotelianism which was firmly rooted 
in the German universities. Initially — and this is a crucial point — the 
description did not use figures, only qualitative, comparative and superlative 
terms, stating that such and such a State was "sparsely populated", "more 
populated", or "densely populated" and the same method was practised in 
comparing other characteristics, resources and so on. This method — as I have 
recently shown — had not yet detached itself from the universality of the 
medieval scientific method, and it hardly differed from the descriptive method 
of the natural sciences despite its subject which was clearly social.6 
In order to arrive at the quantitative method, that is to say, using figures 
in the explanation of social realities, nearly a century of development was 
necessary within this branch of the statistical discipline in Germany. It was 
only the founder of the more developed description of States, Professor 
ACHENWALL of Göttingen, who initiated this development in 1749; but the 
process was not brought to a conclusion until half a century later, around the 
turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. His successor, Professor SCHLÖZER, 
finally recognized the identity of this method with that of political arithmetics. 
I have already shown that the realization of this great change was facilitated 
for ACHENWALL by the pioneering work of Professor SCHMEIZEL, his 
predecessor7 — but, what is more interesting — I have also found that even 
the founder and pioneer of political arthmetics, PETTY, was not without 
knowledge of this rival concept, that is to say, the description of States. The 
proof of this is, no doubt, the definition of his method which was quite new 
and going back to the 1670s, and containing the basic constituents of "the" 
future statistical method. It should be noted that he did not only define this 
method in positive terms — but also contrasted it with the method of the 
description of States, when PETTY wrote in his "Political Arithmetick" that: 
„The method I take to do this, is not yet very usual; for instead of 
using only comparative or superlative words, and intellectual ar-
guments, [underlined by the author of the present essay] I have 
taken the course (as a specimen of political arithmetick I have long 
6 HORVÁTH, R. A.: Aux Sources de la Statistique Allemande, Annales de 
Démographie Historique, 1979, pp. 157 and further — and by the SAME AUTHOR: 
Linné et Schlőzer — Some new Aspects of the Critique of the Descriptive Statisti-
cal School, Statisztikai Szemle, 1978, No. 10, pp. 1018 ff. (In Hungarian with 
summaries in Russian and English.) 
7 BY THE SAME AUTHOR: An unpublished manuscript of (Kőrösy on Martin 
Schmeizel, Demográfia, 1970, No. 1—2, pp. 86ff. In Hungarian with English summary. 
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aimed at) to express myself in terms of number, weight, or measure 
[underlined by PETTY] ; to use only arguments of sense and to 
consider only such causes, as have visible foundations in nature, 
etc., etc."8 
One has to aknowledge the perspicacity of this ingenious and prescise parallel 
from the point of view of method and epistemology, confronted with the late 
medieval scholasticism in its version represented by CONRING. 
It should be noted that this fundamental difference between the specific 
method of the two new branches of the statistical discipline becomes even 
wider, if one takes into account a traditional element of the methodology 
which PETTY in his above definition simply ignored. I am referring to the 
pioneering use of probability calculus in political arithmetics, a major in-
novation which in the last decade of the 17th century existed within this cur-
rent, represented by the smoothing of data on a probabilistic • basis by HAL-
LEY who worked out the famous life table. Two decades later, by way of an 
inversion of the theorem of JACQUES BERNOULLI, the political arithme-
ticians were able to apply the law of large numbers in the statistical estima-
tion of large entities with a law of unknown distribution. Even so, the pos-
sibilities which were opened up by this field of mathematical science and its 
application in statistics were not exploited in a systematical and deliberate 
manner until the rise of the first Grande Ecole Française des Probabilités 
— as represented by LAPLACE, FOURIER and POISSON — and their famous 
astronomer student who later became a statistician, QUETELET.9 
We still have to look at the problem of self-identification of the two 
versions of the statistical discipline — how it is reflected in the denomination 
of the two parallel branches. It seems that their social orientation was 
without ambiguity — a fact which also follows from the terms used to define 
these twin disciplines. During his initial doubts — while trying to designate 
the new discipline of which he considered himself the founder — PETTY 
tried to capture its nature by the term of "political anatomy". According to 
him, it represented the skeleton of a new economic and social system. 
Eventually he changed his mind and firmly introduced the term of "political 
arithmetics", a term which at the same time denotes the specific method of 
this discipline: the political arithmetics analyses real phenomena whereas 
mathematical arithmetics involves imaginary entities. Thus, PETTY has in-
corporated this discipline into the emerging social sciences and most specifi-
cally into that science which has become the most important one since 
MACHIAVELLI, political science.10 
8 The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty, Edited by HULL, C. H., 
Reprints of Economic Classics, New York, 1967, and HORVATH, R. A.: The 
Contribution of Netherlandish Thinking to the Formation of Statistics as an 
Autonomous Discipline, Proceedings of the 36th Session of the International In-
stitute of Statistics, Syney, 1967, Vol. XLII, 2nd. Ed., 710 ff. with a Summary 
in French. 
8 HORVATH, R. A.: Quetelet et la Statistique et son Epoque Acta Univ. 
Szegediens., Jur. et Pol., Vol. XXIII, Fasc. 3, Szeged, 1976, (Monograph) 
10 BY THE'SAME AUTHOR: The Centenary of the "Capital" of Marx and the 
Statistical Science, Statisztikai Szemle, 1967, No. 1080ff., and especially 1089ff. with 
reference to MARX, K. : Critique of Political Economy, written in 1859, where he is 
considering PETTY both as founder of the modern Political Economy and 
Statistics. (In Hungarian with Russian and English summaries.) 
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In his version of German desriptive statistics CONRING used the Latin 
expression "Notitia Rerum Publicarum" and then, in the same sense, the Ger-
man term "Staatenkunde" or "study of States". The importance of the State 
as institution is already reflected in this definition — which seems to imply 
and incorporate a methodological position — to know that the method of this 
new discipline has to be identical with that of the political sciences — that of 
law or the history of the State, with politics or the philosophy of the State: 
i.e., with a qualitative, historical, and speculative method in which mass 
phenomena can only play a subordinate and passive role. 
The more developed version of this branch of German descriptive statis-
tics — against the background of the discovery of the importance of figures 
in the emergence of new mass phenomena in a State — came to be known 
under a general term, and used in the universities where the courses of this 
new discipline were called "vulgo statistica." The term which was invented by 
ACHENWALL was derived both from the Italian word "lo stato" and the 
German word "Staat", and for some time took the more general form of 
"Statistik." These designations of the description of States :— and this is 
common knowledge — were always both designations of the "subject" and the 
"discipline." For this reason, another German designation was also in use at 
the time of ACHENWALL — the word "Staatsverfassung" of the States or 
empires. In a strict sense, this expression designated the system of the 
constitutional law of the State; but in a wider sense, adopted by the came-
ralists, it came to be used for designating the structure of the State, i.e., 
complete with its administrative and financial laws as well as its economic, 
demographic, and social structure. 
This term "Verfassung" — if one does not confine it to the State and 
includes within it an entire society — is identical with PETTY's political 
anatomy and pointing at the same time to the growing convergence of the two 
branches of the statistical discipline in the second half of the 18th century. 
SCHLOZER's famous late medieval formula deliberately linked the economic, 
demographic, and social resources — "Vires" — to the constitutional system — 
"Unitae" — and to the administrative system — "Agunt." This third part of 
the description of the State which was extended to cover an entire capitalist 
society was the exclusive subject of QUETELET's statistical discipline after 
he had abandoned the two other parts which were of a more legal nature, the 
legal constitution and the state administration.11 
The Gottingen School, which constituted a real "school" or "sect" in the 
physiocratic sense of the word, has additionally contributed to the scientific 
establishment of the statistical discipline by elaborating and delineating the 
place occupied by it in the system of sciences which were established during 
the second half of the 18th century. The result was identical with the views 
of PETTY on this point. Notably ACHENWALL as much as SCHLOZER later 
on, regarded the more developed and numerical version of the description of 
states as a discipline of practical politics — an "ars" rather than a "scientia 
politica." It is this discipline, which makes it possible to survey the present 
State and the structure of mass phenomena and furnishes a deepened know-
ledge of the State from an economic, demographic and social point of view. 
It follows that the development of principles und theoretical theses of political 
11 BY THE SAME AUTHOR: op. cit. under 4). 
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science is impossible without it or, at least, remains -remote from social 
reality. If, in line with this thinking — "statistics" only designate that part 
of the discipline of "practical politics" which, above all, utilizes the numerical 
method in the social sciences, it establishes — at least in principle — the 
identity of this current and the Political Arithmetics as used by PETTY. The 
consequences of this development, i. e., the convergence of the two branches 
of statistics, were acknowledged by QUETELET only two decades later, and 
this marked the beginning of a new period in the history of statistics — not 
without important repercussions on epistemology in general. 
IV. As an astronomer, QUETELET began his statistical activities under 
the influence of the Grande Ecole Française des Probabilités and, in this way, 
he turned to the social sciences and became the founder, the "father" of the 
modern and unified statistical discipline. His scientific preoccupations, how-
ever, remained mathematics and physics — which is further illustrated by his 
only essay on a subject of scientific history, i. e., the development of these two 
disciplines in the Netherlands. QUETELET has incorporated into this mathe-
matical science as applied to society, what he considered to be „the" modern 
statistics, the entire tradition of political arithmetics and probability calculus 
as well as the valid results of the German "Staatenkunde". The latter were 
reinforced by the practice of statistical offices which were introduced by 
Napoléon around the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries and benefited from 
the pioneers of statistics in France half-way between Political Arithmetics and 
•the German descrption of States.12 In these offices, which were a kind of 
statistical manufacture, the procedures of compilation and elaboration of the 
statistical material as well as the methods of elementary calculations were 
developed and formed the basis of a technique which facilitated the building 
of an infrastructure of scientific tenets. This task was also accomplished by 
QUETELET who was one of the experts in the official statistical service of his 
country, the Netherlands, and later Belgium. 
It was QUETELET who, in 1835, carried away with a real "statistical 
enthusiasm"13 developed the first version of the method of this modern 
discipline under the title "Sur l'Homme et le Développement de ses Facultés 
ou Physique Sociale." In this work, as far as methodology is concerned, the 
amalgamation of the application of probability calculus and modern statistical 
technique — suited for collecting and processing a large quantity of reliable 
material handled by the offical statistical services — was present in its 
essential form. A methodological exposé, however, was published by QUETELET 
only in 1846 in a monograph entitled "Lettres sur la Théorie de la Pro-
babilité Appliquée aux Sciences Morales et Politiques". In this work, the 
founder of the modern statistical discipline has taken pains to describe the 
role of probability calculus or, more precisely, of the law of large numbers in 
the identification of collective characteristics of "human" faculties — repre-
senting "the population" and not "the individual." 
According to his thinking, these characteristics derive from physical and 
12 BY THE SAME AUTHOR: The Development of Statistics in France with 
special regard to Hungarian Statistics, Acta Univ. Szegediens., Jur. et Pol., Vol. 
XIV. Fasc. 4, Szeged, 1967. (Monograph in Hungarian and summaries in French 
and English) 
13 Expression used by WESTERGAARD, H.: Contributions to the History of 
Statistics, London, 1932. 
social regularities which are named "general causes" in the context of which 
the effect of individual acts is neutralized and effaced as a result of "aleatory 
causes." The result implies a determinism in the "social body" and allows the 
free-will to play a role only within the individual sphere. In my essays which 
focus on the personality and works of QUETELET, I have taken trouble to 
show that in the methodological conception of QUETELET, the supposition 
that all the distributions in sufficiently large numbers and all sample errors 
which are more or less representative converge toward the normal law, was 
not exclusive, despite the fact that his epigones have interpreted the appli-
cation of this law rather in this mistaken direction.14 
A recent article on this subject has underlined the ambiguous nature of 
QUETELET's work, even in the second edition of "Physique Sociale"15 which, 
to be fair, was mainly due to a crisis brought on by a stroke in 1855 and to 
QUETELET's scientific outlook, which remained practically unchanged from 
that time on. The same unfinished character can be discerned about 
QUETELET's work in relation to the subject and theory of the new, modern 
statistical discipline, which, even during QUETELET's lifetime, provoked heated 
controversies, especially over a new rival science which was baptized "so-
ciology" by COMTE. It is a known fact that the latter had the intention to 
call this scientific system "Physique Sociale" and that, after the publication 
of QUETELET's work in 1835, he felt obliged to change his orginal idea.16 
QUETELET made a considerable effort to give a precise definition of the 
subject and the theory of that super-science of man, the structure of which 
had in some way to replace the social theory of modern statistics which was 
still showing'deficiencies. The result was his essay "Du Système Social et des 
Lois qui le régissent", published in 1848. The theme was the whole of mankind 
with all its physical or demographic — and moral — faculties, in the sense 
of the moral or social sciences, as well as its intellectual, i.e., philosophical 
faculties. Thus, his theory led to the establishment of his new quantitative 
social laws, despite the fact that QUETELET was aware that imponderabilia 
existed which defied the utilization of this method. He was resolved, however, 
to identfy "l'anatomie" or "la physique" of the social body with that abstract 
social "man" whose essential feature was conservation, if not perpetuation, 
corresponding to the celestial mechanics in the physical world which 
QUETELET also observed scientifically in his capacity as an astronomer. 
It remained up to future statisticians to consider this conception which was 
both too ambitious and too confused, and decide how to develop the major 
areas of statistics and how to classify it within the scientific system so as to 
make clear its double nature — at the same time firmly attached to the social 
sciences, but progressing steadily toward a universal method — with severe 
epistemological consequences. 
Before going into this further phase of development of the modern sta-
tistical discipline, it seems opportune, at this stage of my paper, to underline 
14 HORVÁTH, op. cit. under 9). 
15 LÉVY, P. M.: Quetelet et la Sociologie Contemporaine: l'Illusion Mathéma-
tique, Mémorial Adolphe Quetelet, No. 4, Adolphe Quetelet 1796—1874, Contribution 
en Hommage à son Rôle de Sociologue, Bruxelles, 1977, lOOff. 
16 FREUND, J.: Quetelet et Comte, ibid. pp. 46ff. especially pp. 48ff, — and 
Adolphe Quetelet, l'Oeuvre Sociologique et Démographique, Choix de Textes par 
LEBRUN, M., Un Dossier du Centre d'Etudes de la Population et de la Famille, 
Bruxelles, 1974, pp. 45ff. 
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that one of the most neglected areas- in the scientific and epistérhologidá^ 
history has been and still is a comparative analysis of the ideas of ;< 
QUETELET and COMTE with respect to the differences and agreements of ; 
their methodology, the subject and theory of the social supersciences which 
they conceived in the shape of "Physique Sociale" and "Sociologie," re-
spectively. While there are lucid comparisons from this point of view, between 
QUETELET and MARX and between COMTE and MARX, we still do not 
have a comprehensive analysis of the two systems of QUETELET and COMTE 
from this particular angle, namely that of epistemology. In this context, Ray-
mond ARON writes in his introduction to "Etapes de la Pensée Sociologique" 
that one can assert, not without solid arguments though, that today's empirical 
and quantitative sociology "owes more to Le Play and Quetelet than to 
Montesquieu and Auguste Comte"17, and he finds that even the efforts of 
LAZARSFELD mentioned by him were undertaken by departing from the 
requirements of sociology rather than from those of statistics.18 Is it necessary 
to class the attempt by QUETELET among the "partial" explications of the 
"totality" of social phenomena, compared with that of COMTE as ARON did 
in the same work: the ideas of COMTE were "global" according to him and 
more dogmatic than empirical, thereby excluding the study of social prob-
abilities — perhaps with special regard to QUETELET?19 The debate on this 
question can be expected to continue for a long time to come. If one 
acknowledges, however, — always in line with the interpretation of COMTE's 
system by ARON — that this author who was both a sociologist and phi-
losopher wanted to synthesize all analytical sciences in a sociological conver-
gence leading to a "sociology of knowledge"20, the new elements of the theory 
of knowledge should be represented in his system and among them those of 
the new mathematical-statistical logic, by establishing, through this method, a 
new epistemology which is more universal than social. 
It is to this problem that we have to direct our attention before finalizing 
the first approximation to this subject of vital importance — laying aside the 
interesting task of establishing numerous convergences between the systems of 
QUETELET and COMTE which existed despite a fundamental methodological 
difference and despite the quasi-identy of the subject as well as in spite of a 
difference in the final interpretation, which was theological rather than 
scientific, of the theory of knowledge on the part of QUETELET.21 
V. QUETELET died in 1874 and the development of the statistical disci-
pline during the last one hundred years was marked by a separation between 
a "mathematical statistics" and statistics known as "non-mathematical" which 
occurred during the last decades of the 19th century. The protagonists of 
17 ARON, R.: Les Estapes de la Pensée Sociologique, Paris, 1967, Introduction, 
p. 16, — and ibid, with reference to LAZARSFELD, P.: Notes on the History of 
Quantification in Sociology, ISIS, Vol. LII, 1961, p. 304ff. 
18 See op. cit, under 15), 16), and 17). 
19 ARON, R.: op. cit, p. 120. 
20 Ibid., p. 121. 
21 Ibid.; p. 123, — where ARON is referring to the "réligion sociologique" of 
COMTE — which corresponds to the line of the present essay as the one possible 
extreme, the.other one being the position of ÖTTINGEN, A.: Die Moralstatistik 
und die christliche Sittenlehre, Versuch einer Sozialethik auf empirischer Grundlage, 
Erlangen 1868—73, 3rd. Ed.: Die Moralstatistik in ihrer Bedeutung für eine So-
zialethik, ibid., 1882. 
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non-mathematical statistics wanted to retain the socio-scientific character of 
this discipline and they wanted to prevent the application of highly mathe-
matical methods and probability calculus which had become increasingly 
complicated. The statisticians who were called mathematical have developed 
them to a growing extent in the areas of scientific application — whether in 
the social or natural sciences, such as in demography and agriculture, — but 
particularly in the pure sciences — natural or exact — such as experimental 
and theoretical physics or pure mathematics. The law of TCHEBITSCHEFF 
formulated in 186722, with its more general interpretation of the law of large 
numbers, facilitated the birth and the triumphant advance of the sampling 
method which became important in political economy and American sociology. 
Toward the end of the last' century, in 1898, BORTKIEWITZ formulated 
the law of small numbers which marked the beginning of the objective 
interpretation of probabilities and of the reformulation of the law of large 
numbers by LAPUNOV on this basis.23 The verification of this achievement 
was impossible before the era of computers but it already exerted a decisive 
influence on the methodology in the mathematical statistics between the two 
Wars, and especially after the Second World War. A first application of 
"statistical laws" in the physical sciences by PLANCK, in 1918, followed 
immediately in the still theoretical research on quanta, but shortly after, when 
it had reached the experimental stage, it successfully led to atomic research.24 
This single example demonstrates "ad oculos" the immense importance of 
mathematical-statistical methods leading to the actual state of our knowledge. 
The concept of "stability" even in the exact sciences was thus overturned. 
This decisive step in statistics was already taken toward the last decade at 
the 19th century when PEARSON established the seven basic types of 
statistical distributions where normal distribution was only a special case 
among others. With their interferences and multiple combinations, the extra-
ordinary variety of the universe of statistical masses became manifest and 
became also one of the generating forces of the development of statistical and 
mathematical methods, aiming at the treatment of the interdependence, either 
aleatory or causal. The explosion of the correlation theory was only one aspect 
of this development, the variety required an increasingly rapid analysis of 
continuity in time and its modeling by simplified schemes or models. 
However, the statistical models of reality showed themselves to be in-
creasingly complicated as their investigation became more thorough. Thus, 
toward the end of the twenties, a double-faced discipline was created, half-way 
between statistics and political economy under the name of "econometrics" 
which preferred to utilize increasingly dynamic and more advanced statistical 
and mathematical methods containing an increasing number of variables. Even 
the structure and the dynamics of causality were modelled, the most famous 
example of which were the MARKOV chains. A similar development took 
place in demography after the Second World War and the outcome is known 
as "pure demography" or "demometrie."25 
22 HEYDE, C. C. — SENETA, E.: J. J. Bienayme, Statistical Theory Anticipated, 
New York — Heidelberg — Berlin, 1977. 
23 Ibid. 
. 24 PLANCK, M.: Akademische Aussprachen, G6ttingen, 1948. with a cumulative 
list of his publications. 
25 WINKLER, W.: Demometrie, Berlin, 1969, pp. 20ff. 
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At the same time, ' an. important development occurred in the area of 
subjective probability. The students of BAYES in the 20th century, by the 
extension of his. theory, paved the way for the formation of the so-called 
"Bayesian statistics" which provided the basis of a decision-making theory 
which in turn has enriched statistical methodology.26 
The results of the development of mathematical statistics — a development 
which at the same time accelerated and grew in its dimension — have led to 
a situation in which it is almost impossible, even for specialists, to grasp its 
current complex state. Old and new ideas and methods have been inter-
changed and mixed to such an extent that the scientific constructions which 
have resulted from them are becoming more and more sophisticated. The 
growing utilization of computers and the particular problems involved in this 
have multiplied the theoretical and practical questions relating to the use 
of these new methods. 
VI. However, instead of losing ourselves in details, the most important 
epistemological consequences should, at least briefly, be recalled to mind. The 
most significant of them is certainly the growing difficulty of interpreting the 
results of current computations and statistical methods, both partial or global. 
These difficulties are multiplied in case of analysis of a social science subject 
whose nature — sometimes almost intractable — today troubles even high-
powered statisticians. We shall only mention two well-known names, MOR-
GENSTERN and JOHN NEUMANN.27 Their line of thinking which they 
represented in statistical epistemology, pure as well as economic, was followed 
up in demographic statistics by HAUSER, DUNCAN and SPENGLER.28 
The doubts and efforts shown by numerous experts have led directly to 
the recognition of the importance to be attached to the problems of the theory 
of statistical knowledge and of epistemology on the one hand, and that of the 
inevitableness of an ultimate interpretation of all statistical knowledge from 
the point of view of the social sciences on the other. This ultimate double-
faced character of all statistical knowledge — apart from its "pure" or proper 
epistemological methodological character — still exists and is inseparably linked 
with the "political" nature of all human knowledge in connection with the 
social body. Thus, it is no coincidence that recently there have been a growing 
number of voices in this direction, in the most developed mathematical sta-
tistics, that of the United States, as for instance is expressed by KISH of 
the American Statistical Association in his presidential address', or the views 
of CHOUCRI — as concerns the demographical statistics.29 
VII. The importance of statistical epistemology as well as the general idea 
behind this brief essay is not only shared by today's sociologists following the 
26 HOULÉ, A.: L'Arbre Généalogique des Bayesiens, Special Document No. 
81—105 of Laval University, Québec, 1981 pp. 7ff. 
27 MORGENSTERN, O.: On the Accuracy of Economic Observations 2nd Ed., 
Princeton, 1963 — v. NEUMANN, J.: Collected Works, I—VI, London — New 
York, 1963. 
«P HAUSER, Ph. M. — DUNCAN, O. D.: The Nature of Demography, The 
Study of Population, Edited by HAUSER, Ph. M. and DUNCAN, O. D., Chicago, 
1959, pp. 29ff. and SPENGLER, J. J.: Economics and Demography, ibid., pp, 791ff. 
29 KISH, L.: Chance, Statistics and Statisticians, Presidential Address, Journal 
of the American Statistical Association, 1978, No. 371, pp. Iff and CHOUCRI, N.: 
Political Implication of Population Dynamics, World Population Plan of Action, 
Vol. II, New York, U. N., 1975, Part 9, pp. 606ff. 
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pioneering activities of LAZARSFELD and others30, but is particulary felt in 
the world of university teaching in many countries. The conviction is gaining 
ground that the teaching of statistics, as a method of knowledge and thought, 
is indispensable to the understanding of a world full of mass and prob-
abilistic phenomena in which we are now living nearing the end of the 20th 
century. This knowledge is indispensable, not only on the level of advanced 
and specialized teaching, but also on the secondary and general and even 
primary levels. This requirement is a realistic one and, in adopting it, "a 
fortiori" an extra scientific effort will have to be made for the clarification 
and establishment of a coherent system of statistical methods as an integral 
part of the theory of knowledge, be it philosophical, mathematical and "pure", 
be it social or "political" in its connections with the epistemology of the 
general or specialized social sciences — among them sociology in par-
ticular. ' . •: j i : ; I i ;; 
Only a profound understanding acquired at all levels of teaching can 
bring about a recognition of the fundamental dualism of our world and 
existence which is full of interdependence of causal and aleatory phenomena, 
resulting in a complex "game" of chance and human willpower, in one word: 
in life itself. 
30 See also: Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences, Edited by LA-
ZARSFELD, P. F., 2nd rev. Ed., Glencoe, 1955, — and STONE, R.: Mathematics in 
the Social Sciences and other Essays, London, 1966. 
